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ABSTIUCT
Government intervention in food grain markets is a common feature of LDC
development efforts. Intervention requires the manipulation of policy
instruments, the motivation and affects of which are often complex and
difficult to understand. An econometric model is used to investigate this
problem for the case of maize, wheat and rice markets in Tanzania. The model
contains six econometric equations for each crop, four of which are government
behavioral equations. The model succeeds in explaining goverment intervention
and in isolating four major constraints that impinge on its behavior in the
short run. The analysis suggests that the government, through instruments at
its disposal, has followed a food self-sufficiency strategy that has insulated
the domestic market from the international market. A simulation analysis shows
that the producer pricing component of this strategy has had a substantial
impact on food grain production and external trade.
I. INTRODUCTION
Strategies to develop a domestic industrial capacity and to develop or
maintain some degree of food grain self-sufficiency are common features of
many LDC development plans. Policy instruments used to implement these plans
include currency exchange rates, quotas, tariffs, subsidies and government
investment in and control of production and marketing systems. Yet, it is
only recently that economists have begun to incorporate this deep government
invo~vement into conanoditytrade models of developing countries. An important
contribution of Timmer and Falcon (1975a, 1975b)in their work on Asian
rice economies was to demonstrate the importance of government-controlled
domestic prices in explaining international trade in rice. Abbottfs (1979)
contribution is one of the more interesting of the recent attempts to incor-
porate government behavior in commodity trade models of developing countries,
unfortunately, with dismal econometric results.
Tanzanian development efforts are exemplary of this deep involvement
of governments in the agricultural sector, and particularly in the food
grain sector. The general objective of this paper is to gain insights
into this involvement by the government of Tanzania, as one case study>
~/ Gerrard is an Assistant Professor of Economics, Department of
Economics and Political Science, University of Saskatchewan and Roe is
a professor in the Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics,
University of Minnesota. This research was supported by the Minnesota Agri-
cultural Experiment Station and a USAID Title XII grant.-2-
and to measure econometrically the impact of this involvement on external
trade in food grains. The usefulness of the paper lies in obtaining these
insights and in demonstrating the use of a method to formulate and to
estimate a trade model that comprises--in addition to the usual demand
and supply equations and the social accounting identity--government price-
setting and stock-adjustment equations.
The paper is organized into six major sections. Background and trends
in agricultural production and trade are presented in Section II. The
extent of government intervention in food grain production and trade is
described in Section 111. This provides a foundation for Section IV where
the behavioral equations for defining government intervention in food grain
markets are specified. These equations, along with the retail demand and
farm level supply equations, yield six equations in six endogenous variables
for each of the food grain crops, maize, wheat and rice. It is shown in
Section V that the model provides a good fit to the data. In the con-
cluding sections, simulations are performed to obtain insights into the
effect on and motivation for government intervention in food grain
markets .
II. SETTING
Approximately 90 percent of Tanzania’s total population of about 17
million reside in rural areas, comprising in the neighborhood of 2.3
million families and about 8000 villages. Hence, it is not surprising
that agriculture dominates the Tanzanian economy, accounting for an average
of 40 percent of GDP and an average of about 70 percent of merchandise
exports. Table II-1. shows that the annual average rate of growth of the
agricultural sector for the period 1968-1978 was less than the rate ofTable II-1. Gross
and
-3-
Domestic Product, Agricultural Production
Annual Rates of Growth.
..
GDP, $US



























Sources: GDP and Population estimates were obtained from: IMF,
International Statistics, 1978 Annual and UN, Yearbook of
National Accounts Statistics, 1978.
Agricultural production estimates were obtained from USDA, ESCS,
“Indicies of Agricultural Production in Africa and the Near East,”
Statistical Builetins 556 and 623.
a/ GDP is calcualted as the 1970-1972 average in 1971 prices at the
offic~al rate of exchange.
~1 All annual rates in this and subsequent tables are in ~eal terms.
The rates are calculated from the regression equation Yt = (l+-r) Yo,
estimated in logarithmetic form.-4-
growth in GDP. While GDP and GDP per capita grew at an annual average rate
of 5 percent and 2.2 percent respectively, total agricultural production
advanced at an annual average rate of only 1.9 percent. Agricultural pro-
duction per capita actually decreased at an annual average rate of .9
percent.
The agricultural sector is characterized by small farm plots where






plots are maize, cassava, sorghum, millet and rice. Accordingly,
of the rural population is dominated by cereals, roots and tubers.
~Ao estimate#/
for the period 1972-74, these crops accounted
60 percent of the total consumption in terms of calories.
major export crops produced on small farm plots include coffee,
cotton, cashews, cloves, and tobacco. Sisal, tea and sugar tend to be
produced enlarger farms which are now, for the most part, government con-
trolled through a parastatal affiliation. About 90 percent of the wheat
crop and 10 percent of the maize crop are grown on large farms that were
nationalized in the early 1970s.
The consumption, production and imports of maize, wheat and rice for
the period 1964 to 1978 are shown in Table 11.2. Maize production has
nearly equaled maize consumption on a per annum basis during this period,
while imports of wheat and rice have been necessary to satisfy the annual
excess demand for these grains. Annual growth in imports of these three
grains has ranged from 2.5 percent for wheat to about 8.2 for maize,
Imports of maize were particularly important during the drought which
occurred in 1973-75.Table II-2. Consumption, Production
1964 to 1978.
-5-
and Imports of Major Food Grains,
Average domestic consumption
(MT per annum)
Domestic consumption per capita
(kg. per person per annum)
Average domestic production
(percent of domestic consumption)
Imports (MT per annum)
Average, 1964 to 1978








111. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE IN FOOD GRAINS
A. Government Intervention in Food Grain Markets. Public intervention
in economic activity is derived from Tanzania’s objectives for social and
economic development which are outlined in the Arusha Declaration of 1967.
Extensive public intervention in economic activity has meant effective
state control over the major means of production. Rural development has been
characterized by the creation of Ujamaa (Cooperative) villages while control
over the major means of production has meant the nationalization of large
scale industry, commerce, finance and the creation of over 300 parastatal
firms (over 100 of which are directly responsible for agricultural pro-
duction) and numerous crop authorities. Among the priorities set forth
in the Arusha Declaration is the need for rural and agricultural develop-
ment and self-reliance in national and local development efforts. In light
of the droughts experienced in the early 1970’s, the 1977/78-79/80 national
development plan placed emphasis on the need to further increase domestic
food grain crop production, namely
been interpreted as one of placing
3/ self-sufficiency .—
Extensive public intervention
prices at both the farm and retail
maize and millet y
. This emphasis has
greater emphasis on a policy of food
has also meant the control of commodity
level. Parastatal processing and
retailing firms and crop authorities c!ontrolthe marketing of most agri-
cultural commodities from the farm gate to the retail store. Food prices
are administered through various government entities. In 1973 the National
Milling Corporation (NMC) took over the functions of the National
Agricultural ?roducts Board. The NMC is the parastatal responsible for
purchasing farm level supplies of cereals crops. It is virtually the sole
buyer of wheat. The marketing of export crops.is the responsibility of the-7-
respective crop authorities, e.g.s the cotton authority> t- authority> and
coffee authority, etc.
Retail markets for food, are for the most part, also nationalized,
except for fruits and vegetables, and sales occur through government operated
retail outlets. The Tanzanian Price Commission, established in 1973, is
responsible for setting and enforcing retail food prices based on a cost plus
method. However, consumer prices tend to be changed at more frequent inter-
vals than producer prices. Transportation of agricultural inputs and
commodities is also controlled by the public sector through public ownership
of transport facilities, equipment and through licensing of private vehicles.
The mechanism for setting farm level prices is different for food grain
crops than for cash crops. In the case of food grains, farm prices are
announced by the NMC prior to the growing season.
Tanzanian’s pan-territorial pricing policy requires that official prices
are applied in a uniform manner throughout the entire country, i.e., that a




is charged for an agricultural input regardless of the sales
government’s willingness to purchase and supply food grains
imports throughout the year at prevailing announced prices
has led to substantial deficits on the accounts of many parastatal firms,
particularly the accounts of the National Milling Corporation.q’
B. A Model of Government Intervention in Food Grain Markets. The
purpose of this section is to conceptualize a model of government intervention
in food grain markets in the long run. This serves to simplify the detailed
model of each food grain market presented in the next section.
The model of the intervention process is based on the maintained hypothesis
that the government succeeds through intervention in maintaining the ruling of
announced prices in food grain markets each year. More specifically, it is-8-




the consumer price, CPt, government held stocks, St and net imports M .
t
The conceptualization of a structural model of government behavior, where
the above target prices become explicit functions of the reduced form equations
of the structural model, is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, our
approach is to posit che relationship between targets and explanatory vari-
ables. To simplify the exposition, we shall proceed in two steps. In this
section these relationships are posited on the assumption of a static world
where the governments possess perfect knowledge of past and future events.
This assumption is relaxed in the second step where at the time the govern-
ment establishes targets the information available to the government and the
method by which the government forecasts future events is specified. This
addition changes the nature of the specification developed in this section
but it does not alter the number of equations or the number of endogenous
variables in the model.
The first step is to postulate that, in the long run, the government
A
has a target producer price for each food grain, PP, that varies in relation
to the autarky price, SSP and the world price, WPt, as follows:
t’
(3.1) P;t= n + a.SSPt + B.wPt
where n, a and 6 are parameters to be estimated. The autarky price SSPt,
is defined as the price that would prevail at market equilibrium without
government intervention. It is the intersection of the domestic supply and
demand curves.
Next, it is postulated that governments long run target consumer
A
price, CPt, varies in relation to the target producer price
(3.2) C;t = c + U.PP
t-9-
where K and p are parameters to be estimated. Since marketing services are
supplied by the various parastatal firms and crop authorities, implicit in
this formulation is a degree of subsidy or tax on these organizations.
It is pointed out above that food grain stocks are held by NMC in
order to maintain spatial and temporal prices in a manner that appears
approximately consistent with announced prices. To permit the market to
clear at announced prices, intervention must occur through the manipulation
of stocks or imports. In the case of stocks it is postulated that the
,.
government authorities long run target level of carry over stocks, St, for
the end of each year is based on their experience in previous years. The
A
value of St is estimated as a linear trend of actual observed ending stock.
levels in previous years.
The social accounting identity is given by
(3.3) Mt = QDt - QPt + St - St-l
where Mt is net imports in year t, QDt is the domestic quantity demanded,
QPt is the quantity processed and St is the government carryover stocks.
The assumption that the government is the only holder of carryover stocks
is implied by this identity.
A . .
Given the long run targets PPt, CPt, St,
supply and demand curves, the long run target
. . ,. A A
(3.4) Mt = QDt - QPt+ St- St-l
and knowledge of the domestic
levels of imports is given by:
which states that the government’s long run pricing and stockholding
decisions imply a long run target level of imports/exports.-1o-
The
that the
model of long-run government intervention developed above assumes
government possesses perfect information when targets are announced.
In reality these targets may not be observable because of short-run con-
straints and various
cannot forecast, and
targets in any given
IV. THE ECONOMETRIC
other supply and demand disturbances that the government
instead, must react by deviating from established
year. This problem is addressed in the next section.
MODEL
The supply and demand functions for each commodity are specified first.
Then, the government equations are specified. Allowance is made for infla-
tion and the assumption is relaxed that the government has perfect knowledge
when it announces producer and consumer prices.
governments long-run target equations to account
run constraints and other contingencies completes
Modification of the
for the effects of short-
the model.
The variables in
i = 1, 2, 3, refer to
for each commodity is
endogenous variables:
the model are defined in Table IV-1. The subscripts,
maize, wheat, and rice, respectively. The model
a market clearing model with six equations and six
the quantity demanded, the quantity produced,
government-announced producer and consumer prices, government-held stocks,
and net imports.
A. The Supply and Demand Equations, The supply equation for each
commodity is a conventional Nerlove partial adjustment model:
3
(4.1) QPit = bio +Z bij (PPjt/PPFt) -bi4 (PPEt-l/ppFt) +ci t
j=l


















































The short run response to own-price is given by bii and the “long run”
response by bii/(l-di). Substitution in production with export crops
is allowed. The linear time trend is a surrogate for technological
change and other forces that are shifting the supply curve outwards over
time.
The demand equations in the model are also conventional:
3
(4.2a) PCQDit = a~o + Z a~j(CPjt/CPIt) + ei (PCYt/CPIt) +u~ and
j=1
lt‘
(4.2b) QDit = POPt . PCQDit.
PCYt is private consumption expenditure per capita, not income per capita,
so that the parameter e is the marginal propensity to consume
i
out of
private expenditure. The system is non-linear as it stands. It inconvenient
for the future development of linear cross equation restrictions to transform
(4.2b) into a linear system with a heteroscedastic error term as follows:









“ POPt + a~o l (POPt-~) + ; a~jl (POPt-~)”(CPjt/CPIt) .
j=1
and consumer prices in the supply
in the supply equation by the
demand equation by the consumer
It will be noted that both producer
and demand equations have been deflated,
producer price of fertilizer, and in the
price index. More explicitly, it is assumed that both demand and supply
response are homogeneous of degree zero in the relevant prices (and
expenditures) . The use of fertilizer prices as an index of the cost of-13-
production follows the successful example of Timmer and Falconq’ in their
work on the Asian rice economies.
Directprices in each equation are treated as exogenous
producers and consumers since the prices are determined by




supply and demand equations for each commodity, they are treated as
exogenous variables, to each model. Therefore, for futher ease of
exposition, it is assumed that the three food grain markets are separable,
i.e. that the cross-price elasticities are zero. This assumption will be
relaxed when the models are estimated, but for now it makes it possible
to drop the commodity subscripts, and to rewrite the supply and demand
equations as follows:
(4.3a) QPt = b. +bl (PPt/PPFt) - b4 (PPEt-l/PPFt) + c t + d QPt-l +Vt, and
(4.3b) QDt = a. - al (CPt/CPIt) +e (Yt/CPIt) +Ut
The model for each commodity is identical, and therefore the further
development of each model is conducted in terms of a single model.
B. Government Behavioral Equations: Specification. We now return to the
specification of the governments four long run targets: the producer price,
A A
PPt , equation (3.1), the consumer price, CP
t’
equation (3.2), government-
held stocks, it, and net imports, it, equation (3.4).
The first modification in the long-run model of government intervention,
equation (3.1) to (3.4) is to allow for inflation (because such allowance
is made in the supply and demand equations). In
(3.2), it is convenient to deflate prices by the
CPIt, as follows:




(ci@PIt) = ~ + al”u (PPt/CPIt), or
(4.4) A = K+P (Yt”P;t). yt “cPt
This implies that real marketing costs and real government subsidies (or
taxes) to the marketing boards remain constant over time, while nominal
costs and subsidies increase at the same rate as the consumer price index.
The parameter taken from equation (4.3b), al, is the absolute value of the
demand for the commodity with
into the equation for reasons
al
is a constant, it does not
J-
respect to its own price. It is introduced
that will become clearer shortly. Since
materially change the equation. The variable
Yt9 that is, al/CPIt, is a scaling factor that ceteris paribus converts
nominal consumer prices into quantities of product demanded in each year.
Prices in the consumer price equation can conveniently be deflated by
the consumer price index because
only on demand. However, prices
government-set consumer prices impact
in the governments producer price equation
are deflated by a weighted average of the producer price of fertilizer,
PPF since producer prices impact on supply, and the consumer price index,
t’
CPIt. The CPIt deflater is used because consumer prices impact, through




= al”p/CPIt + bl/PPFt,
where b
1
is taken from the supply equation
completely analagous to y in the consumer
t
(4.3a). This deflator
price equation. It is
is
a scaling
factor that converts nominal producer prices into quantities of excess
demand (demand minus supply) of product in each year. The governments
producer price equation is now rewritten as-15-
(4.5) ‘t = rl+a (nt ssPt) +f3 (ITtWTt). ITt l PP
The next step is to relax the assumption that the government has
perfect knowledge and state how it must formulate expectations of SSPt
and WP The information available to the government depends on the
t“
timing of its actions. When the government announces new producer prices,
generally about halfway through period t-1, the latest information available
includes S FXRt ~, and WP Information also includes; PPEt ~ and
t-2’ - t-2“
QPt-l, since prices in period t are set after production in period t-1 has
taken place and before planting in year t begins. But the government does
not know WP
t-1’
Wt, andY . Furthermore, while it is assumed to have
t
perfect knowledge of the deterministic components of the supply and demand
equations, it does not know the random disturbances in these equations,
and Vt.
‘t
The expected autarky price, Et-2SSPt, is defined as the market-
determined price at the producer level that the government would expect
to prevail under autarky given the government-determined margin between
consumer and producer prices in equation (4.4). It is the expected
intersection of the domestic demand and supply curves with the expected
random disturbances in these curves equal to zero and with expected real
(Y /CPIt), equal to the fitted values private consumption expenditure, Et-2 t
of a linear trend. It is calculated from a simultaneous system of four
equations in fourunknowns including the demand equation, the supPlY equation,
the government-determined consumer price equation (4.4) and the identity




~_2(Yt/CPIt) - b. + b4 (PpEt_l/ppFt)
-ct- d Qpt-l”-16-
The expected world price, Et ~WPt ~, was taken to be the fitted values
of the following equation:
(4.7) ~t-l= go +gl WPIt-l+ g2WPt-2+g3WPt_3 +Zt.
The assumption is that the evolution of world prices can be represented
by a stochastic second order difference equation, the deterministic
components of which are known to the government. This produced remarkably
good fits (R2 ranged from .803 to .882) in spite of the fluctuations in
world prices over the time period under reivew.
Upon substituting the conditional expectations for SSPt and WP
t-l‘
equations (4.4) and (4.5) represent long run government pricing behavior,
i.e., they reflect the underlying policy of the government over the entire
period in question. These are the prices that the government would have set
if it had experience no constraints on its behavior from year to year. But
in actual experience, there are short-term constraints on government behavior
that cause actual government-announced prices, actual stocks, and actual
imports to diverge in any given year from the long run target level. The
next task is to take these constraints into consideration.
in
at
Abbottk/ proposed that there are three major constraints operative
most developing countries. First, if government-held stocks inherited
the end of one period are low, then the government may desire to
build up stocks by one of three methods: increasing the producer price,
the consumer price, or net imports above the long run target level.
Secondly, the government may be facing a foreign exchange constraint. In
this case, it may wish to reduce imports below the long run target level,
which it can effect by increasing the producer price above the target
level, by reducing stocks below its target level or both. Thirdly, the-17-
government may receive some foreign assistance in kind, such as PL480
7/
imports, which may reduce the level of commercial imports in a given year.—
It is probable that all three constraints have been operative in
Tanzania. In addition, there is a fourth contingency in the nature
of unavoidable and impossible to anticipate disturbances in the supply,
Vt, and demand equations, Ut, as each year unfolds. The government
accommodates these disturbances by changing the level of stocks or by
engaging in international trade. This permits markets to clear at
announced prices.
Allowing for the conditional expectations presented above and the
impact of constraints on short-term government behavior, the government










= IC+ p (yt~PPt) + ~1 (;t-St_l) + 61 (FXRt-FXRt_l)
u ‘L480t ‘w2t’
St-st ~ = c -u (m”wPt) + 01 (i -s y t J + r32(;t-stJ - C1(F;Rt-FXRt-l)
- <2 (FXRt-FXRt z) + A PL480t - 0 UDt + W3t, and
A .
Mt = QD - Q;t + V-U (mt”WPt) + Xl (St-St-l) + X2 (St-St-2)
t
- c1 (F;Rt-FXRt-l) - S2 (F;Rt-FXRt-2) + 1 pL480t + P UDt +w4to-18-
where UD is the only variable that remains to be defined. The removal
of “~” implies that all variables are observable. These are the final
government behavioral equations. All the government parameters are
postulated to be greater than or equal to zero (with the possible exception
of the constant intercepts, rI,K, g, and v). Note that Roman letters have
been used in the supply and demand equations, and that Greek letters have
been reserved for all the government behavioral parameters.
The variable UD
t’
appearing in the stock and net
measures the unanticipated demand and supply shocks,
import demand equations,
Recalling that PPt = E
t-2ppt
and CP = E
t t-l Cpt’
it follows from the supply and demand equations, that
this is given by
UDt = QDt - Et_lQDt - (QPt - E~_2QPt),
which equals
(4.12) UDt = Ut +e (Yt/CPIt - Et_l(Yt/CPIt)) -vt.
The unanticipated demand contains three components: the error term in
the demand equation, the error term in the supply equation, and the
expenditure elasticity of demand times the deviation of real private
consumption from its previously expected value.








UDt is positive but very small, it seems
will respond in the least cost way which
But stocks can never fall below zero, so
likely that the
is to reduce stocks
that if UD& is very
9 L
government will be forced to acquire additional imports to meet
at the prevailing prices. Therefore, the response of both
imports to unanticipated demand and supply shocks is likely tobe
to
-19-
non-linear. Equations (4.10) and (4.11) incorporate a linear approximation
this response with both the parameters, $ and p, postulated to fall
somewhere between zero and unity.
The stock and foreign exchange constraints are represented as deviations
.
from a linear trend where St and FXRt are the fitted values of their
respective linear trends over the estimation period. Deviations from trend
of stocks or foreign exchange reserves are postulated, as represented
in the equations, to induce governments
run targets.
All four equations have two parts,
to deviate from their own long
the first part representing long-
term government behavior, and the second part representing deviations from
this long-term behavior owing to the operation of short-term constraints.
To prevent the short-term constraints from affecting the estimated values
of the long-term parameters, or the constant intercepts, n and K, the mean
of the five independent variables that appear on the right hand side of the
producer and consumer price equations are normalized to zero over the
period of estimation. This normalization procedure does not change any
of the estimated parameters (except the constant intercepts) because the
specification of all equations is linear. Furthermore, it makes no
difference whether the stock constraint in the produce price equation,
“ -s for example, is represented as (St ~-2), (St-1-St-2), or (St-2-St-2),
since the fitted trend is linear.
All four equations have error terms that represent unexplained
government behavior from year to year. Because the government is intervening
in food grain markets in four ways simultaneously, the unspecified forces
that underlie the four error terms--such as a drought in one year--are
likely to be similar, resulting in nonzero correlations between the four
disturbances.-20-
C. Government Behavioral Equations: Identification of Parameters. The
four government variables are overdetermined and the government behavioral
parameters are overidentified as the model now stands. To handle this
problem, cross-equation restrictions are imposed on the parameters in the
government equations--restrictions implied by the demand and supply equations
and the identity--that will uniquely determine the government variables.
The unique advantage of this approach is that one can also test the null
hypothesis that the restrictions are true. Since all the exogenous
variables that appear on the right hand side of equations (4.8) to (4.10)
also appear in the net import demand equation, the restrictions were
calculated by inserting the other three government equations plus the demand
and supply equations into the social accounting identity (3.3) and then
solving for net imports as a function of all the exogenous variables and the
error terms.
After some algerbra, this calculation yields:
(4.13) Mt =
t t-2sspt) -@(Tt”Et-2~t-1) -~(~t”wpt)
v + (1-a)”(?rSE
+ (el-ljl)”(st-sta) + (e2-lhJ”(st-’t-2)
- (C1+dl)”(FiiRt-FXRtJ - (C2+d2)S(F;Rt-FXRtJ
+ (x+(d)PL480t + (1-~) UDt + W3t - Wlt - W
2t
These are precisely the cross-equation restrictions in the four equations
that are necessary in order to identify exactly the government behavioral
parameters given the supply equation, the demand equation, and the social
accounting identity.
The complete model for a single commodity in a single country is
summarized in Table IV-2, where the supply and demand equations are listed














































cross-equation restrictions are listed in the lower half. Imposing these
restrictions while estimating the four equations simultaneously will of
course change the estimated values of the parameters. The more interesting
question is whether these changes are statistically significant.
In summary, the model is a dynamic model that takes into account the
information available to the government when it makes its decisions,
and incorporates government expectations about future events. The dynamic
nature of the model is as follows. At the beginning of each period, the
government has announced a new set of producer and consumer prices that
prevail throughout the entire period. Domestic producers and consumers
respond to these prices. Markets clear at the ruling prices by government
intervention which takes the form of adjustments in government stock
levels and by engaging in international trade. The key feature of the
model is that, while government intervention in the form of prices,
changes in stocks, and international trade remains exogenous to producers
and consumers, it is treated as endogenous to the model and as influenced
in a systematic way by the state of the world in each year as viewed by
the government. This state of the world includes world prices, government-
held stocks and foreign exchange reserves inherited from previous periods,
PL480 imports, and unanticipated demand and supply shocks as each year
unfolds, all of which are exogenous variables to the government. Short-
term constraints mask long-term behavior. By incorporating both into the
equations, it becomes possible to separate the two econometrically to
determine endogenously the degree to which the domestic market has been
separated from the international market on the average over the period




Estimation Problems and Procedures. Most of the data to estimate
model were collected at USDA in Washington, D.C., from USDA data
banks, government of Tanzania documents, and IMF publications.
Production and trade data refer to crop years beginning in each calendar
year. Stock data refer to the end of each crop year. Consumption was
constructed as a residual from the identity, the production, trade, and
stock data and refers to annual disappearance in each year.
All producer prices are the government-announced prices prior to
planting in each crop year. Consumer prices are those collected by the
Bureau of Statistics that were used in the calculation of the consumer
price index for Dar-es-Salaam.
Private consumption expenditure, population, the consumer price index,
foreign exchange reserves, and world prices were all taken from the IMF,






ports U.S.A. for maize and wheat, and f.o.b. Bangkok,
the supply and demand equations were estimated first.
relationship in demand theory imposes cross-equation
cross-price coefficients in the demand equations,
these were estimated simultaneously with these restrictions imposed,
8/
using Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression technique.— The three
equations were also estimated without the restrictions imposed and the
likelihood ratio was calculated to determine if the restrictions significantly
affected the estimated parameters.
The four government equations in each commodity model were also
estimated simultaneously with the cross-equation restrictions imposed in
order to identify exactly the government parameters. To keep the-24-
restrictions linear, they were imposed at the mean values of the
variables POP, CPI and PPF. With the stock equation (St-St-l) transformed
to -(st-st-l), this procedure also imposed the restrictions on the error
terms.
Finally the parameters, K and M, are required to calculate the
expected autarky price E ssPt , but they can only be estimated in the
t-2
complete model once E SSPt has been calculated. Therefore an
t-2
iterative procedure was adopted. Initial values of K and p were derived
from a single equation estimation of the consumer price equation. These
were used to calculate Et 2SSPt from which new estimates of ~ and B were
derived from the four-equation simultaneous estimation. This procedure
was continued until u converged to within one percent, which was generally
achieved after about three iterations. Once the final estimates of K and p
were obtained, the four government equations were also estimated without
the cross-equation restrictions imposed. Then the Lagrange multiplier




A. Demand and Supply Equations.





Results from fitting the per capita
and rice appear in Table V-1. Since
three degrees of freedom is 7.81, the
imposed by the Slutsky conditions are not rejected at the
significance.
The demand functions fit the data remarkably well. All signs are
correct except the cross-price effects between maize and rice (-.1367) and
(-.0396), although, they are not significantly different from zero in-25-
Tzble V-1. Per capita consumption elasticities, Tanzania, 1964 to 1977







Maize -.8978 .0299 -.0396 .8478 .0924 .767
(-5.88) (0.52) (-0.50) (3.42)
Wheat .1765 -2.6943 .6363 1.4637 .0118 .761
(0.37) (-5.32) (1.51) (2.52)
Rice -.1367 .2378 -1.0453 1.0990 .0332 .703
(-0.58) (1.55) (-4 . 83) (2.97)
The likelihood ratio for the cross-equation restrictions imposed
by the Slutsky relationship is 5.78 on 3 degrees of freedom, which





The actual equations estimated were linear; the elasticities have been
calculated at the mean. T-statistics are shown in parentheses below
the elasticities.
The consumer prices that appear as independent variables in the
equations are generally those reported by the Central Bureau of Statistics
that were used in the calculation of the consumer price index for
Dar-es-Salaam. There is a large element of control over these
prices as the government generally enforces maximum retail prices
for staple grains.
The three equations were estimated simultaneously using Zellner’s
seemingly unrelated regression technique, while at the same time
imposing the cross-price restrictions derived from the Slutsky
relationship.either case. All direct price
significant.
Both the direct price and
for wheat followed by rice and
-26-





and it is consistent with observations in other countries. This ranking
of price and expenditure elasticities suggests that wheat i.e. a prestige
food grain relative to the other grains while rice is preferred relative
to maize. Nevertheless, the expenditure elasticity for maize is also
large, suggesting that it is preferred to roots and tubers. As income
increases, demand for these grains will increase relative to maize, or
conversely, differential changes in income, say between rural and urban
areas, will cause differential rates of growth in food grain demand.
Unfortunately, Tanzania is not a low cost producer of wheat. Hence rising
incomes, especially in urban areas, will likely increase the import demand
for wheat.
Results from fitting the total and marketed production equation for
maize, wheat and rice to the data appear in Table V-2. The equations
provide a reasonably good fit to the data with significant direct price
effects and expected signs obtained in all cases.
In the case of the total production equations, the partial adjustment
coefficient suggests fairly rapid adjustment in the quantities of maize and
rice produced to price changes. Wheat, which is produced almost exclusively
on government farms, appears to respond the slowest of the three crops to
price changes. The annual rate of growth in wheat production also lags
behind the rate of growth in the production of the other crops, with rice
showing the most rapid growth rate. The results also suggest that maize
competes for resources used in the production of export crops; a one-27-
l!able v-2. Short run supply elasticities, Tanzania, 1964 to 1978
—
Producer prices Annual — Partial R’
growth adjustment
>13 ~ze Wheat Rice Export rate coefficient
crops (percent) (l-d) “
— —.
TOTAL PRODUCTION




Wheat -.650 .989 - 1.03 .673 ..562
(-1.16) (1.97) (0.40) (2.90)
Rice -.328 .426 -.027 5.12 1.177
(-1.55) -
.804
(2.39) (-0.10) (5.07) (8.76)
MARKETED PRODUCTION
Maize 2.290 -1.571 -1.78 .918 .530
(3.26) - - (-2.79) (-0.63) (5.38)
Rice -.954 2.290 -.803 0,83 1.077 .818
(-1.77) (6.11) (-1..58) (0.46) (7.00)
Notes:
1. The actual equations estimated were linear; the elasticities have been
calculated at the mean. T-statistics are shown in parentheses below the
elasticities.
2. The maize, wheat, and rice prices that appear as independent variables
in the equations are government-announced prices prior to planting in each year.
The price of export crops is a Paasche index of government-announced
producer prices for coffee and cotton.
3. Marketed production of maize and rice and total production of wheat
correspond to purchases by the National Milling Corporation in each year.
In the case of maize and rice, the total and marketed production equations
were estimated simultaneously, for improved efficiency, using Zellner’s
seemingly unrelated regression technique.
—-28-
percent increase in the price index of export crops results in an average
of about .2 percent decrease in the production of maize. The results
also suggest that maize competes for resources with both wheat and rice.
Also consistent with expectations are the relatively large direct
price elasticities associated with the marketed production of maize and
rice, and again, evidence (-.954) which indicates that maize and rice
competes for the same resources. Marketed maize production is also
responsive to the price of export crops, decreasing by about 1.6 percent
per a one percent increase in the price index of export crops. The same
relationship for rice is about .8 percent. Since the majority of maize
and rice produced are on small farm plots, these results suggest that
those plots yielding a surplus over household consumption needs,and
perhaps sales in unofficial markets,are responsive to the relative terms
of trade between food and import crops. Indeed, virtually no lag exists
in their supply adjustment response to price changes from year to year.
Also revealing is the virtually zero annual growth rate in marketed
production of maize and rice. Since marketed production corresponds to
purchases by NMC, this result suggests either that the marketed surplus of
maize and rice over farm household needs has been stagnant or that
marketed production has been bypassing official channels.
B. Government Behavioral Equations. The estimated government behavioral
equations are presented in Tables V-3, V-4, and V-5, one table for maize,
wheat, and rice, respectively. The actual equations estimated, with the
cross-equation restrictions imposed, are shown in the bottom half of each
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The overall model explains 58 percent of the variation in maize
imports over the period, 89 percent of the variation in wheat imports,
and 92 percent of the variation in rice imports. Not including the
intercepts, there are 22 separate parameters in each model. In the maize
model, there are only 5 incorrect signs; and of the 12 variables that are
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level, 9 have the
expected signs. In the wheat model, there are 11 wrong signs; but 8 of the
11 variables that are significantly different from zero have the expected
signs. In the rice model, there are only 2 wrong signs; and all ten of the
variables that are significantly different from zero have the expected signs.
In the maize model (Table V-3), the government-announced producer
price has been equally a function of the expected autarky and world prices.
The estimated elasticity of net imports to the expected world price is
-11.45, which implies that small changes in the world price can transform
Tanzania from a net importer to a net exporter, or vice versa. This seems
reasonable since external trade in maize has averaged only 4 percent of
domestic consumption over the entire period.
When stocks ofmaize are low at the end of one period, the primary
response of the government is to import more in the next period in order
to build Up stock, and the secondary response is to raise consumer prices.
When foreign exchange reserves are low, the government will generally
reduce imports by increasing producer prices, but this response is not
significant.
The government’s response to PL480 imports is to lower consumer
prices and to increase imports. In this instance, food aid is demand-
creating; it does not simply substitute one-for-one with commercial imports.
The government’s response to unanticipated positive demand and supply shocks-33-
is primarily to import (78 percent of the response), and secondarily to
reduce stocks (22 percent). This is exemplory of a government that uses
international trade as a buffer stock in order to moderate domestic
price changes. The government has not been able to use stocks alone to
accommodate demand and supply shocks because the average level of stocks
over the period (50.3 thousand metric tons) has been less than the average
demand and supply shocks (85.1 thousand metric tons). Production has been
very unstable from year to year.
In the wheat model (Table V-4), the government-announced producer
price has been primarily a function of the expected autarky price; the
estimated response to expected world prices has actually been negative.
This perverse response can arise because of collinearity between the
expected autarky and world prices. However, examination of the partial
correlation coefficients suggests that this Collinearity does not change
the major conclusion that the primary response is to the self-sufficiency
price. When stocks of wheat are low, the government builds up stocks
equally by importing in the next period, and by raising consumer prices.
When foreign exchange reserves are low, the government imports significantly
less in the next period, primarily by increasing consumer prices and
secondarily by increasing producer prices. Unlike the case of maize, the
government’s response to PL480 imports is insignificant, but similar to
maize, the overwhelming response to unanticipated demand and supply
shocks is to import more.
In the rice model (Table V-5), the government-announced producer price
has been primarily a function of the autarky price. There is a slight,
but insignificant response of the correct sign to world prices. When
stocks are low, the government responds primarily by importing more in the
next period, and secondarily by increasing consumer and producer prices.When foreign exchange reserves are
the next period by reducing stocks
-34-
10W, the government imports less in
and by increasing both consumer and
producer prices. The response of total net imports to PL480 imports
is positive but insignificant from zero. Unlike the case of maize,
PL480 imports do not appear to be demand-creating because the major
response is to such food aid is to build up domestic stocks. As in the
case of both maize and wheat, the major response of the government to
unanticipated demand and supply shocks is to import more (79 percent of
the response) and secondarily to reduce government stocks (21 percent).
In summary, the models have succeeded in capturing significant
short-term responses by the government, and in isolating four major
constraints that impinge upon government behavior -- government-held stocks,
foreign exchange reserves, PL480 imports, and unanticipated demand and
SUppl”yshocks. Some of these responses are very consistent for all three
commodities. The general response to low levels of stocks is to import
more in the next period; to foreign exchange reserves, to adjust domestic
prices; and to unanticipated demand and supply shocks, to equilibrate
domestic demand and supply by engaging in international trade. The only
significant response to total net imports to PL480 imports occurs in the
maize model.
Most importantly, the models have succeeded in separating long-term
government pricing behavior from selected short-term
long run, by which is meant the underlying policy of




moved more or less in tandem, although
reduce the margin between consumer and
and rice. Also, the major determinant
there has been some tendency to
producer prices in the case of wheat




the crop to domestic consumption,
-35-
World prices have had a secondary
a coincidence that the more important
the more important has been the influence
of world prices, since in this case, deviations of domestic prices from
world prices are more costly for the government to maintain.
Finally, the government equations were also estimated without the
restrictions imposed. The restrictions are expected to be accepted
because they are imposed so as to be consistent with the social accounting
identity on average over the period of estimation. The Lagrange
multiplier test implies that the restrictions are not accepted in two
cases, i.e., that the restrictions on the maize and rice equation in the
government model may be violated in any particular year. An interpretation
of this result is that, over the period of estimation, the government may
not have been consistent in its reaction to the exogenous variables in
government equations for maize and rice.
VI. THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT PRICING POLICIES ON EXTERNAL TRADE IN FOOD GRAINS
It has been pointed out that Tanzania is a net importer of all three
grains and that net imports have been increasing over time. It is reasonable
to ask whether this picture has been caused by the underlying state of
development in Tanzania or whether it has been caused by specific
government policies in the food grain sector.
Because all the independent variables in the producer and consumer
price equations except Et ~SSPt, Et-2Wt ~, and PPt were normalized to
a mean of zero, the estimated long run target producer and consumer prices
are given by
Piit = rl +a.E t *SSPt + Bi E and
i 1- t.zwpt-l’
. ,.
Cpit = Ki + !Jippit, i = 1, 2, 3,-36-
where ni, ai~ fii,K , and P are the estimated coefficients in each model.
i i
Calculating the values of P~it and CF for the period of the study
it
provides a description of long run government pricing policy. These
results are summarized in Table VI-1. For ease of exposition, the
expectation operator, Et z, has been dropped from the autarky and world
price variables listed in the table.
The first feature of government policy that emerges from the table
is that the margin between consumer and producer prices differs little
from margins maintained on average in four other countries in East
Africa.”/ Margins are larger for rice and wheat than for maize since
more of the product is lost in processing (35 percent in the case of
rice, 25 percent for wheat, and 10 percent for maize). It has been
observed that the National Milling Corporation has been running a persistent
deficit in recent years.s’ This would seem to imply that theNMC is
providing an inefficient service.
The impact of long-run pricing policy on producer prices is shown
in part b. of the table. Even at the official exchange rate, the rate
of taxation on the producers of export crops has been large (about 32
percent over the period) and it has been increasing over time. In 1977,
the margin was estimated to be about 47 percent. Given a more realistic
exchange rate for the Tanzanian shilling, this rate would be even greater.
Furthermore, maize production has been taxed on average over the period
by about 24 percent, once again at the official exchange rate; wheat production
has been subsidized by about 15 percent; and rice production taxed by
about 36 percent. However, in all cases, the rate of taxation has been
decreasing (or the rate of subsidy increasing) over time. If observed
trends have continued to the present, the rate of taxation on maize productionTable VI-1. Description of
-37-
government pricing policies, Tanzania, 1964 to 1977
a. Consumer prices
Commodity Ratio Mean Linear trend Overall mean
1/ of four countries -
AA
Maize cPt/PPt 2.5987 -.0002 2.4092
Wheat c;t/P;t 2.914 -.035 2.937
Rice cit/P;t 3.498 -.020 3.580
b. Producer prices




‘t .683 -.024 (-5.14)
Maize P$t/ssPt .946 .018 (2.91)
PPt/WPt .760 .023 (8.07)


























~/ Simple average of the mean ratios for Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, and Malawi,
2/ The variable T is the ratio of producer —
world prices, f.o,~. Dar-es-Salaam, weighted
‘t
= ( ; PPit*QPit)/( ; WPit*QPit)
i=l i=l
to coffee and cotton.
prices of export crops to their
by quantities produced, as follows:
9 where i = 1, 2, refer-38-
would drop to zero in 1981. In general, food grains have been taxed less
than export crops, and significantly less over time. This pattern is
consistent with stated government policies, and therefore it is not
surprising to find that food production has been increasing more rapidly
12/
than export crop production over the period. —
While at first glance it may seem inconsistent to tax the production
of two food grains and subsidize the third, this is not so inconsistent
when viewed in terms of a self-sufficiency objective. Our empirical
results provide strong evidence that a degree of self-sufficiency in food
grain production is indeed a major government objective. While the rate
of taxation on the three crops varies considerably, the degree of self-
sufficiency maintained varies much less, from 84 percent in the case of
wheat to 95 percent in the case of maize. Rice production has been taxed
the most because Tanzania is a low-cost producer in relation to the world
price, and wheat production has been subsidized because Tanzania is a
high-cost producer. As a general statement of government policy in
Tanzania, we conclude that producer prices have been maintained at a
roughly constant degree of self-sufficiency over the entire period, given
the degree of taxation on export crops and the margins maintained by the
National Milling Corporation, and therefore the rate of taxation on production
has been higher, the lower the cost of producing the crop domestically.
This conclusion supports that of section V that government-announced
producer prices have been influenced more by the autarky price than by
the world price.
The impact of Tanzanian pricing policy on the external trade in food
grains is considered next. Based on the estimated equations, four simulations
were performed. The results are reported in Table VI-2. The impact of-39-
Table VI-2. The impact of government pricing policies on external trade
in food grains, Tanzania, 1964 to 1977
Commodity Variable Simulation Mean Linear trend t-statistic
number for trend
Maize WPt/ssPt 1 1.133 -.025 (-3.02)









Mt 4 47.9 -16.3 (-2.76)
Wheat wPt/ssPt 1 .668 -.006 (-1.29)
Mt 1 89.0 2.2 (2.59)
Mt 2 84.6 3.9 (5.71)
14t 3 30.0 1.6 (1.81)
M
t
4 31.5 3.6 (4.09)
Rice WPt/ssPt 1 1.412 -.015 (-0.92)
Mt 1 -80.5 2.5 (0.69)
Mt 2 -69,9 2.7 (0.80)
Mt 3 20.1 0.7 (0.79)
Mt 4 21.6 1.1 (1.21)
Simu- Producer prices Consumer prices
lation
World prices number Estimated Overall mean Estimated
at official long run margin for long run
exchange rate target prices four countries target margin
i’producer pricing policy can be seen
simulations 3 and 4. Simulations 1
-40-
by comparing simulations 1 and 2 with
and 2 set producer prices at world
prices, evaluated at official exchange rates. Simulations 3 and 4 permit
the estimated government pricing equations to determine producer prices.
Simulation 1 is distinguished from simulation 2 by permitting consumer
prices to be based on the mean margin between consumer and producer prices
observed in four countries in East Africa (simulation 1) compared to the
consumer prices given by the
prices (simulation 2). This




These distinctions serve to provide
results to consumer pricing policy.
Except for government producer
insights into
pricing equation for consumer
alternative estimate of the actual
applies to simulations 3 and 4.
the sensitivity of the
and consumer prices for food grains
and export crops, the simulations incorporate
development policies in Tanzania, the rate of
population growth, the rate of growth in real
the impact of all other
growth of agricultural production,
private consumption per capita,
the expenditure elasticity of the demand for food grains, and the rate of
inflation in Tanzania (as represented by PPFt and CPIt) compared to the
rate of inflation in the rest of the world (as represented by the world
prices of food grains
been at world prices,
per capita would have
and export crops). If domestic prices had actually
an argument could be made that real private consumption
grown more rapidly, but, lacking a general equilibrium
model of economic development in Tanzania, it has not been possible to
incorporate this effect. Neither were the effects of fertilizer subsidies
or the overvalued exchange rate taken into account.The simulation suggests that
maize and rice in relation to the
-41-
Tanzania has been a low-cost producer of
world price--the ratio, WP&/SSP& has been
L L
greater than unity--and a high-cost producer of wheat. These results are
hardly surprising considering that wheat is a temperate crop, while maize
and rice are sub-tropical. The cost of producing all three crops has been
increasing over time and in the case of maize, Tanzania became an average
cost producer of maize (with WPt/SSPt = unity) roughly in 1976.
A comparison of simulations 1 and 2 with simulations 3 and 4 indicates
that the major impact on food grain markets has been the governments
producer pricing policy. If domestic prices had been at world market prices
over the period, Tanzania would have been a net exporter of maize and rice
and a net importer of wheat. In all three cases, net exports would have
declined (or net imports increased) over time. Instead, by taxing maize
and rice production, Tanzania became a net importer of both, and by
subsidizing wheat production, it became a less significant net importer of
wheat. The picture does not change dramatically
consumer prices is added. Not surprisingly, the
sufficiency in food grain production has reduced
in international trade from net exports of 126.3
when the impact of government
government’s policy of self-
Tanzania’s participation
thousand metric.tons to
net imports of 47.9 thousand metric tons in the case of maize; from net
imports of 89.0 to 31.5 thousand metric tons of wheat; and from net
exports of 80.5 thousand metric tons to net imports of 2.16 thousand metric
tons of rice. In the case of maize, policy has also reversed the trend from
one of increasing net imports by 21.2 thousand metric tons a year to one of
decreasing net imports by 16.3 thousand metric tons.-42-
VII . CONCLUSIONS
It has been shown that government market intervention in Tanzania has
effectively divorced the domestic market for food grains from the
international market and that this has had a significant impact on external
trade in food grains. We have put forward a method, easily duplicated by
other researchers, and demonstrated its efficacy in separating short-term
government policy from long-term policy, and long-term pricing policy from
long-term development trends. While the method can be improved, especially
with regard to the treatment of the exchange rate, it utilizes a conceptually
simple partial equilibrium framework that estimates endogenously the degree
to which domestic prices diverge from international prices without stretching
the existing data in most developing countries beyond its limits. In
Tanzania, within a general policy of import substitution industrialization
that has taxed on net the agricultural sector, specific government policy
with regard to food grains can be characterized as one that seeks to
maintain a degree of self-sufficiency in food grain production, and that
therefore limits the degree of taxation that the government can consistently
impose on the food grain sector. External trade in food grains has been
very unstable from year to year owing to the operation of short-term
constraints and the government’s response to them. Over the long run,
Tanzania is becoming a higher cost producer of all three food grains in
relation to the world price, and therefore in order to maintain its policy
of self-sufficiency, taxes of food grains have become lower and lower
over time in relation to taxes on export crops.-43”
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